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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
 
EDIBLE ARRANGMENTS, LLC and  : CIVIL ACTION NO.    
EDIBLE ARRANGMENTS    : 3:14-CV-00250 (VLB) 
INTERNATIONAL, LLC    : 
Plaintiff,     :  
       :  
v.       :  
       :  
PROVIDE COMMERCE, INC.,   : 
 Defendant.     : July 29, 2016 
              
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. #116] 
 
I. Introduction  
 The Plaintiffs, Edible Arrangements, LLC, and Edible Arrangements 
International, LLC, (“EA”) bring this action against Defendant Provide Commerce, 
Inc. (“Provide”), alleging trademark infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 
1114(1)(A) (Count I); false designation of origin or sponsorship and unfair 
competition in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(A) (Count II); trademark dilution in 
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(C) (Count III); common law trademark infringement 
(Count IV); unfair competition and deceptive trade practices in violation of the 
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. 42–110b(a) et seq. 
(“CUTPA”) (Count V); and violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(D) (“ACPA”) (Count VI).  Currently pending 
before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  For the 
reasons that follow, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED 
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IN PART with respect to EA’s ACPA (Count VI) claim AND DENIED IN PART with 
respect to all other claims (Counts I – V).   
II. Factual Background 
a. The Parties 
Plaintiff EA is a leading seller in the United States and internationally in 
artfully designed fresh fruits that are sculpted in the shapes of flowers and 
arranged to resemble floral arrangements.  EA also sells “gourmet, chocolate 
Dipped Fruit™, fruit salads, and fruit-based beverages.”  [Def.’s Mem. at 3].   
Defendant Provide is a direct competitor of the Plaintiff which sells a 
variety of gift products including flowers, chocolates, fresh fruit, gift baskets, and 
personalized gifts under brands such as “ProFlowers,” ProPlants,” 
“RedEnvelope,” “Personal Creations,” “Shari’s Berries,” and  Cherry Moon 
Farms.”  [Dkt. 118, Def.’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement (“SOMF”) ¶ 1].  Particularly 
relevant to this case is Provide’s brand Shari’s Berries, which offers a variety of 
items through its online store at <www.berries.com>, including “hand-dipped 
strawberries, cherries, and apples; hand-decorated cake pops; handmade 
s’mores; and pretzels hand-dipped in caramel and coated with decadent 
toppings.”  [Id. ¶ 2].   
Provide does not sell shaped fruit or fruit that is packaged to resemble 
floral arrangements.  [Dkt. 119, Ex. 2; Pl.’s R. 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 9].  Provide 
does sell coated fruit products that compete directly with some of EA’s “Dipped 
Fruit™” products.  [Dkt. 136, Ex. N.].  EA argues that its coated fruit products are 
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superior because EA uses real chocolate in its fruit coatings, while Provide uses 
imitation chocolate.  [Dkt. 136, Ex. O, Ex. P].  Nonetheless, neither party appears 
to dispute that Provide and EA are direct competitors in the market for chocolate 
and fruit-based gift packages.  [Dkt. 119, Ex. 2; Pl.’s Mem. at 5]. 
   
b. EA’s Mark and Its Use 
EA has advertised, marketed and sold its fresh fruit products (“the EA 
Goods”) under the trademark “EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS” (“the EA Mark”) since 
1998.  [Dkt. 136, Ex. A ¶2.].  EA has been granted “multiple U.S. registrations for 
the EA Mark,” including at least two registrations on the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) principal register, since as early as 2005, at U.S. 
Reg. Nos. 3844160 and 2934715.  [Dkt. 136, Ex. B].  EA’s mark has also been in 
continuous use for seventeen years.  [Pl.’s R. 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 3].  EA admits 
that there have been “numerous attempts” to plagiarize the mark, which have 
resulted in “aggressive polic[ing]” by EA in the form of cease and desist letters 
sent to more than a dozen companies using the mark and at least one lawsuit.  
[Id. ¶¶ 12-13].   
 
c. Keyword Advertising 
“Keyword advertising” is a common method of advertising used by 
companies to market their products through programs offered by Internet search 
engines such as Google, Bing, and Yahoo.  [Def.’s R. 56(a)(1) Statement (“SOMF”) 
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¶ 16].  The premise behind keyword advertising is that companies wish to have 
their advertisements appear when consumers use search engines to search for 
particular terms.  [Id. ¶ 17]. To ensure that their advertisements appear when 
consumers search for particular terms, companies pay fees to the search engines 
by “bidding” on those terms.  [Id. ¶ 19].  Consumers searching via Google, Bing, 
and Yahoo have no way of knowing which particular terms advertisers have bid 
on; thus, keyword bidding is often referred to as “non-consumer-facing.”  [Id. ¶ 
20]. 
An example offered by the defendant would be the following scenario: 
when a consumer enters “Pizza Hut pizza” into a search engine, competitors 
such as Papa John’s, Domino’s, and Little Caesars wish to have their 
advertisements appear on the results page so that the consumers may have easy 
access to their websites and purchase their pizza.  Such companies would thus 
need to bid on keyword terms such as “pizza,” “Pizza Hut,” “Domino’s,” “Papa 
John’s,” and “Little Caesars.”  Figure I, below, depicts this scenario. 
Figure I. 
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Provide notes that it bids on thousands of terms, including some terms 
that describe its products, such as “fruit,” “dipped berries,” “edible fruit,” 
“flowers for moms,” “Valentine’s birthday cake,” “fruit bouquets,” and “edible 
arrangements.”  [Id. ¶ 23].  Provide also bids on EA’s mark as a keyword, so that 
consumers searching for “edible arrangements” would see an ad for a Provide 
gift-seller.  [Id. ¶ 22].  In addition, EA notes, that Provide bids on keywords related 
to EA that clearly are not descriptive of any Provide product, including “edible 
arrangements locations,” “edible arrangements coupons,” “edible arrangements 
promotional code,” “edible arrangements bouquet,” “edible arrangements 
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flowers,” “cheap edible arrangements,” “edible arrangement discount,” and 
“incredible edible arrangements.”  [See Dkt. 136, Ex. X, Ex. Y, Ex. Z].   
 
d. Provide’s Consumer-Facing Advertisements 
Because of Provide’s purchase of the EA Mark as a keyword, when a 
consumer would search for “edible arrangements,” Provide’s ad would populate 
in the search results as an “Ad related to edible arrangements” and that exact 
text appears at the top of Provide’s advertisement.  [Dkt. 119, Ex. 25].  Beneath 
the text that reads “ad related to edible arrangements,” the consumer would then 
see the text of Provide’s actual advertising slogan(s).  Prior to 2010, Provide used 
the phrase “edible arrangements” to describe its products in its advertising 
slogans.  Sometime after receiving a cease and desist letter from EA in February, 
2010, Provide began using variations of the mark, including “Edible Fruit 
Arrangements” (e.g., “Save More Than 50% On Edible Fruit Arrangements”).1  
[SOMF ¶ 24].  These advertisements are the subject of the instant suit. 
Provide highlighted the term “Edible Fruit Arrangements” in its 
advertisements in that the text containing that phrase was larger, underlined and 
in a different color than that the font used in the rest of the advertisement.  See 
Figure I, infra.  Provide claims that it only used this phrase “in close proximity to 
its own brands, such as ProFlowers or Shari’s Berries.”  [Id. ¶ 27].  However, EA 
                                                            
1 Provide also used EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS as a keyword for products 
completely unrelated to fruit – namely the ProFlowers floral products – because 
the keyword “results in sales.”  [See Ex DD., Two Dep. Tr. at 217:1-18]. 
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has provided an example of at least one such advertisement in which “Provide’s 
brand names – ProFlowers, Shari’s Berries and Cherry Moon Farms – did not 
appear anywhere in the ad except for the [URL] website address.”  [Dkt. 119, Ex. 
5].  Moreover, the web address appears in smaller text beneath EA’s mark and 
does not necessarily identify the seller as a particular brand.  [Id.].  The Provide 
advertisement that is cited by EA as an example appears below at Figure II.  
Provide claims that it no longer uses the phrase “Edible Fruit Arrangements” in 
its advertisements. 
Figure II. 
 
 
e. Provide’s “Competitor” Marketing Campaign and EA’s Evidence of 
Confusion 
EA argues that in internal records, Provide identified EA as one of its 
biggest competitors and engaged in a marketing campaign described as the 
“Edible Arrangements Campaign” that is also labeled “competitor” (hereinafter 
“the Competitor Campaign”).  [Dkt. 136, Ex. AA, Ex. BB, Ex. CC at PC2828 
(referencing “Edible Arrangement keyword set”), Ex. T, Ex. U].  Provide’s 
Manager of Search Engine Marketing, Charles Twu, acknowledged that the 
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purpose of the EA Competitor Campaign was to generate revenue by driving 
traffic to Provide’s competing websites.  [Ex. DD, Twu Dep. Tr. 199:4-200:5].   
Keyword bidding on variations of the term “edible arrangements” is one of 
Provide's most successful tools for converting sales.  [See Dkt. 136, Ex. BB, Ex. 
FF at PC2767, Ex. GG at PC2305].  In one document reviewing Provide’s 2012 
Mother’s Day promotions, “‘EDIBLE ARRANGEMENTS” is the top generator of 
“impressions” for Shari’s Berries.  [Dkt. 136, Ex. EE at PC_0002774].  An 
“impression” occurs when an advertisement is displayed on a potential 
consumer’s search results page.  [See Ex. DD, Twu Dep. Tr. 43:16-18].  EA argues 
that Provide’s “Competitor Campaign” has in turn generated numerous 
“conversions” for Provide.  [Dkt. 133, Pl.’s R. 56(a)(2) Statement ¶ 20].  A 
“conversion” occurs when a consumer clicks on an ad and places an order.  [Id.].   
EA sent a letter to Provide on February 9, 2010, objecting to Provide’s use 
of the phrase “edible arrangements” in “advertising several competing goods 
and services.”  [SOMF ¶ 29].  On March 25, 2010, Provide tacitly admitted that it 
used the phrase in its response, explaining the steps it had taken to ensure that 
the exact phrase “edible arrangements” would no longer appear in the text of its 
advertisements displayed through the Google AdWords program.  [Id. ¶ 35].  
Four, years later, on February 6, 2014, EA sent another letter to Provide, again 
objecting  to Provide’s: (i) purchase of the phrase “edible arrangements” as a 
non-consumer-facing keyword through the Google AdWords and Bing Ads 
programs; and (ii) use of the phrase “edible fruit arrangements” in the text of its 
advertisements displayed through the Google AdWords and Bing Ads programs.  
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[Id. ¶ 39].  Two weeks after EA’s second letter, EA filed the instant action against 
Provide.   
During discovery, EA produced call log records of seven telephone calls 
from consumers to its customer service department inquiring about the status of 
orders which were not placed with EA.  EA representatives suspected (but were 
unable to confirm in every case) the consumers were instead attempting to place 
or may have actually placed an order with companies affiliated with Provide.  
[SOMF ¶¶ 73-74].  The records of these seven calls do not reflect whether the 
orders in question originated with the consumer clicking on one of Provide’s 
keyword advertisements.  [Id. ¶ 74].  
 
f. Provide’s Alleged Cybersquatting 
In early 2014 EA became aware of several “typosquatting” domains – web 
addresses similar to EA’s web address and mark but using deliberate 
misspellings – including edibelarrangements.com, ediblearangements.com, and 
ediblearragements.com (hereinafter the “Typosquatting Domains”).  [See Dkt. No. 
32 at ¶24].  It is undisputed that the registrants of the Typosquatting Domains are 
foreign domain privacy services, including a Panamanian entity known as 
Fundacion Private Whois (“Fundacion”) and an Australian entity known as 
“Whois Privacy Services Pty Ltd.” (“Whois Privacy”).2  [See Dkt. No. 53-3; 53-4; 
                                                            
2 The parties dispute whether EA is able to subpoena the entities in the United 
States or file a Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) action in order 
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53-5].  It is also undisputed that Provide did not register the domain names.  
[SOMF ¶ 46].   
EA asserts, however, that agents of Provide control the domain names.  
Specifically, EA contends that Provide hired two digital marketing companies in 
late 2013 to increase its web traffic – adMarketplace, Inc. and 7Search, Inc.  [See 
Dkt. 136, Ex. KK, (adMarketplace contract); Ex. LL, pp. 21-28 (invoices)].  The two 
companies placed advertisements on the Typosquatting Domains and redirected 
traffic landing at the domains to Provide’s own websites.  During discovery, EA 
obtained records showing that the Typosquatting Domains redirected to 
berries.com over 1700 times and that the redirections appeared to occur through 
adMarketplace and 7search.  [See Dkt. 136, Ex. II; Ex. EE].  Provide admits that it 
“suspects” the two companies “may have been involved in the redirection of the 
domain names.”  [SOMF ¶ 56].  Provide sent letters to both companies instructing 
them to discontinue the redirection of traffic to Provide’s websites.  [Id. ¶ 57].  EA 
claims that the redirection of traffic from the Typosquatting Domains ceased 
immediately thereafter. 
 
III. Legal Standard 
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
                                                            
to reveal the true registrant.  EA argues that neither measure would be effective.  
[Pl.’s Mem. at 11, n. 13].   
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as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The moving party bears the burden of 
proving that no factual issues exist.  Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 
106 (2d Cir. 2010).  “In determining whether that burden has been met, the court is 
required to resolve all ambiguities and credit all factual inferences that could be 
drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.”  Id. 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).  “If there is any evidence in the 
record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the nonmoving party, 
summary judgment must be denied.”  Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Hapag Lloyd 
Container Linie, GmbH, 446 F.3d 313, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
“A party opposing summary judgment cannot defeat the motion by relying 
on the allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere 
assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.  At the summary 
judgment stage of the proceeding, Plaintiffs are required to present admissible 
evidence in support of their allegations; allegations alone, without evidence to 
back them up, are not sufficient.”  Welch–Rubin v. Sandals Corp., No.3:03cv481, 
2004 WL 2472280, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 20, 2004) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); Martinez v. State of Connecticut, No. 3:09cv1341 (VLB), 2011 
WL 4396704 at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 21, 2011).  Where there is no evidence upon 
which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it 
and upon whom the onus of proof is imposed, such as where the evidence 
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offered consists of conclusory assertions without further support in the record, 
summary judgment may lie.  Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearance Co., 604 
F.3d 712 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 
IV. Discussion 
a. EA’s Claim for Trademark Infringement 
To succeed on its trademark infringement claim, EA must prove that: 
(i) “its mark is entitled to protection,” and (ii) “even more important, that the 
defendant's use of its own mark will likely cause confusion with the plaintiff's 
mark.”  Gruner + Jahr USA Pub. v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1074 (2d Cir. 
1993).  This same test also applies to EA’s claims for: (i) federal trademark 
infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (ii) federal false designation of origin and 
unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (iii) common law trademark 
infringement; and (iv) state unfair competition and deceptive trade practices 
under Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110b(a).  See Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 
146 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying the two-prong test to claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 
1125(a)); Verilux, Inc. v. Hahn, No. 05-Civ-254, 2007 WL 2318819, at *10 (D. Conn. 
Aug. 10, 2007) (test for common law trademark infringement and unfair 
competition under Connecticut law is identical to that under the Lanham Act). 
 Provide does not dispute that EA’s trademark is valid and protectable; 
rather, the parties have presented three issues for resolution. Those issues are (i) 
whether Provide’s use of “EDIBLE FRUIT ARRANGEMENTS” in consumer-facing 
ads creates a likelihood of confusion, (b) whether EA can assert a trademark 
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infringement claim based solely on Provide’s purchase of the EA Mark as a non 
consumer-facing keyword and whether such purchases create a likelihood of 
confusion, and (c) whether Provide’s advertisements constitute fair use of the 
mark.  [See Def.’s Mem. at 15-16].  The Court considers each issue in turn. 
 
i. Whether Provide’s Use of “EDIBLE FRUIT ARRANGMENTS” is 
Likely to Cause Confusion 
“[T]he crucial issue in an action for trademark infringement or unfair 
competition is whether there is any likelihood that an appreciable number of 
ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, 
as to the source of the goods in question.”  Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry 
Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978).  Federal courts determine whether a mark is 
likely to cause confusion based on an assessment of the Polaroid factors.  These 
factors include: (i) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (ii) the degree of similarity 
between the competing marks; (iii) the proximity of the products, and the 
likelihood that the prior owner will “bridge the gap”; (iv) actual confusion; (v) the 
defendant’s good faith; (vi) the quality of the defendant’s products; and (vii) the 
sophistication of the consumers.  The Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hosp. Corp., 89 
F.3d 955, 960 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 
492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)). 
Summary judgment of non-infringement in a trademark case is proper 
when the balance of factors weighs in the defendant’s favor such that no 
reasonable jury could find a likelihood of confusion; however, a court need not 
find that all factors weigh in the defendant’s favor.  See, e.g., Streetwise Maps, 
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Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 21 159 F.3d 739, 746 (2d Cir. 1998) (balance of factors 
weighed in the defendant’s favor even though the mark was entitled to some 
protection and the parties’ products were in direct competition).   
 
1. The Strength of EA’s Mark 
The strength of a mark refers to “its tendency to identify the goods [or 
services] sold under the mark as emanating from a particular, although possibly 
anonymous, source.”  The Sports Authority, 89 F.3d at 961 (quoting McGregor–
Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir.1979)).  There are two 
components of a marks’ strength: its inherent distinctiveness and the 
distinctiveness it has acquired in the marketplace.”  Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s 
Rest., 360 F.3d 125, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).   
An incontestable, registered trademark enjoys a presumption of inherent 
distinctiveness.  Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 457 (2d Cir. 2004).  The 
parties dispute the extent to which EA has been able to register the marks.  
Provide notes that “when EA first applied to federally register “edible 
arrangements” as a trademark in 1999, the USPTO refused registration on the 
basis of descriptiveness” which led EA to amend its application to seek registry 
on the secondary supplemental federal trademark register “thereby conceding 
that the phrase ‘edible arrangements’ is descriptive.”  [SOMF ¶ 8; Dkt 119-4, Ex. 
B].  EA, however, has submitted at least one registration of the phrase “edible 
arrangements” which has been accepted on the principal register, has been in 
continuous use with no adverse decisions against the mark for more than five 
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years and which bears no disclaimer.  [See Dkt. 134, Ex. C (U.S. Reg. No. 
2934715)].  That registration is therefore incontestable. See 15 U.S.C. §1065. 
The strength of an incontestable registered trademark may be overcome by 
the use of a descriptive or weak portion of the mark, or generic and descriptive 
words taken from a stylized logo.  See W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. The Gillette 
Co., 984 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.1993) (incontestable registered trademark for 
“Sportstick” lip balm not infringed by Gillette's “Sport Stick” deodorant); Gruner 
+ Jahr USA Pub., a Div. of Gruner + Jahr Printing & Pub. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 
991 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (2d Cir. 1993) (where stylized logo of the word “parents” 
for a magazine title was an incontestable mark, use of the word “parents” 
divorced from that logo was “clearly weak”).  Provide, which bears the burden of 
proof in moving for summary judgment, has not argued or offered evidence that 
EA’s incontestable registration concerns only a stylized logo from which Provide 
has taken descriptive words and has therefore failed to rebut the presumption in 
favor of inherent distinctiveness.3 
Moreover, the Court finds that EA’s mark has acquired secondary meaning 
or distinctiveness in the marketplace.  In evaluating whether a mark has obtained 
secondary meaning, courts look to a number of factors, including: “(1) 
advertising expenditures, (2) consumer confusion studies, (3) unsolicited media 
coverage of the product, (4) sales success, (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark, 
                                                            
3 Indeed, Provide’s reply memorandum did not contest EA’s assertion that it 
possesses an incontestable registration and ignores the issue altogether.  
16 
 
and (6) length and exclusivity of the mark’s use.”  Connecticut Cmty. Bank v. The 
Bank of Greenwich, 578 F. Supp. 2d 405, 413 (D. Conn. 2008). 
EA has submitted evidence that the mark has been in continuous use for 
seventeen years and that EA has spent “over $160 million in advertising since 
2008.”  [Dkt. 134, Ex. C. (Dipippa Decl.)].  EA has garnered unsolicited media 
attention by, for example, “repeatedly being named a Top Franchise by 
Entrepreneur Magazine . . . [and] being named E! News’ gift of choice for Golden 
Globe nominees.”  [Dkt. 134, Ex.’s D-L].   EA has earned billions of dollars in 
revenues since 2001.  [Dkt 134, Ex. C].  EA has not submitted any consumer 
confusion studies, but it does cite a survey conducted by Provide which found 
that EA had 77% brand awareness among consumers nationally.  [Dkt. 134, Ex. M. 
at PC 000967].  Provide has pointed to numerous attempts to plagiarize the mark 
by other parties, prompting EA to send “dozens” of cease and desist letters to a 
range of both large and small businesses.  [SOMF ¶ 12].  Provide has offered no 
further evidence suggesting non-distinctiveness in the marketplace.   On these 
facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that EA’s mark has acquired secondary 
distinctiveness in the marketplace.   
A reasonable jury could certainly conclude that the strength of EA’s mark 
weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion because the mark has both 
inherent distinctiveness by virtue of its incontestable registration, as well as 
secondary distinctiveness in the marketplace. 
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2. The degree of similarity between the competing marks 
In assessing the similarity of the marks at issue, courts look to two key 
questions: (1) whether the similarity between the two marks is likely to cause 
confusion and (2) what effect the similarity has upon prospective purchasers.  
The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 962.   
Provide notes that “each trademark must be compared in its entirety; 
juxtaposing fragments of each mark does not demonstrate whether the marks as 
a whole are confusingly similar.”  [Def.’s Mem. At 24, citing Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming summary 
judgment finding that “Donkey Kong” does not create a likelihood of confusion 
with “King Kong”)].  Provide argues that its use of the phrase “edible fruit 
arrangements” is distinguishable from EA’s mark “because it was not used in a 
trademark sense, and because it contains the additional term “fruit,” which EA’s 
mark does not contain.”  [Def.’s Mem. At 24]. 
With regard to the addition of the word “fruit” to the mark, EA argues, 
persuasively, that “a subsequent user may not avoid likely confusion about the 
origin or the product by appropriating another's entire mark and adding 
descriptive or non-descriptive matter to it.”  [Pl.’s Mem. At 19, citing Fisons 
Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 477 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation 
omitted)].  To state the obvious, fruit offered for sale is supposed to be edible. 
The word “edible” is a superfluous modifier of the word “fruit” in an 
advertisement for a fresh fruit product offered for sale by a company named 
“Sheri’s Berries.”  A typical consumer would likely realize that “Sheri’s Berries” 
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was offering for sale fruit which was edible, as opposed to inedible, plastic or 
imitation fruit decorations.  A reasonable jury could find that the addition of the 
word fruit does not serve a clear “differentiating role.”  Morningside Group, 182 
F.3d at 141 (addition of the words “capital” and the substitution of “LLC” for 
“limited” did little to differentiate “The Morningside Group Limited” from 
“Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C.”); see also, Connecticut Community Bank, 
578 F. Supp. 2d at 418 (addition of the word “Trust” did little to differentiate 
“Greenwich Bank & Trust” from “The Bank of Greenwich”).   
Provide also argues that the marks can be differentiated because it used 
the phrase “edible fruit arrangements” in conjunction with reference to its 
“house” brands (e.g., ‘Shari’s Berries’).  Those terms, however, were not always 
used in conjunction with one another.  In at least one of the advertisements 
provided to the Court by EA, Provide’s “house brand” only appears in the web 
address of a link contained in the advertisement.  Further, it appeared beneath 
the much larger and more readable text advertising, with each word capitalized, 
“Edible Fruit Arrangements.”  See Figure II above.  The "house brand" is not 
prominently displayed and when it is displayed it is virtually obscured by the far 
more prominent term “Edible Fruit Arrangements.”   
A reasonable trier of fact could therefore find that Provide has not 
distinguished its use of the mark with its own branding.  The operative and 
identifying words of both marks are the words “edible” and “arrangements” and 
as such the marks are highly similar.  This factor weighs heavily in favor of EA. 
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3. Similarity of Competing Products  
The third Polaroid factor focuses on whether the two products compete 
with each other.  “To the extent goods (or trade names) serve the same purpose, 
fall within the same general class, or are used together, the use of similar 
designations is more likely to cause confusion.”  Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 458.  
Provide does not dispute that its fruit products are similar to EA’s fruit products.  
However, Provide argues, without citation to authority, that this factor “should 
not weigh heavily in the analysis because the products that are similar are exactly 
the products that are described both by EA’s mark and by the descriptive phrase 
used by Provide.”   [Def.’s Mem. At 32].  On the contrary, the fact that Provide is a 
direct competitor selling goods within the same general class (even the same 
specific category of gift) and serving the same purpose weighs heavily in favor of 
finding that Provide’s use of EA’s mark is likely to cause confusion.  See 
Connecticut Community Bank, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 418 (noting that ‘Greenwich 
Bank & Trust’ and ‘The Bank of Greenwich’ “provide virtually identical banking 
services . . .  to an identical consumer base . . . [t]his factor weighs heavily in 
[Plaintiff’s] favor.”).   
 
4. Actual Confusion 
Evidence that confusion has actually occurred is “convincing evidence that 
confusion is likely to occur.”  Morningside Group, 182 F.3d at 141.  Provide 
argues that EA has not “offered any survey evidence showing a likelihood of 
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confusion.”  [Def.’s Mem. at 26].  However, “although the absence of surveys is 
evidence that actual confusion cannot be shown,” a reasonable trier of fact “may 
still conclude that actual confusion exists in the absence of such evidence, so 
long as there is other evidence of actual confusion.”  The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 
964 (internal citations omitted). 
EA notes that it has identified seven instances where consumers 
“contacted EA’s customer call center with inquiries and/or complaints about 
purchases made from Provide under the mistaken impression that the companies 
were either the same or affiliated.”  [SOMF ¶¶ 73-74].  Provide argues that these 
incidents do not evidence actual confusion because, EA did not identify whether 
the orders about which the calls were made originated with the consumers 
clicking on one of Provide’s keyword advertisements and that the consumers 
actually made the purchases from a Provide company believing that they were 
purchasing the products through EA.  [Id.].   
However, “evidence of actual confusion need not be limited to evidence of 
mistaken completed transactions” and the inquiry “need not be confined to 
evidence that [the Defendant] was able to ‘pass off’ its services as those of 
[Plaintiff].”  Morningside Group, 182 F.3d at 141.  Rather, evidence of actual 
confusion “regarding affiliation or sponsorship is also entirely relevant to the 
ultimate likelihood-of-confusion inquiry.”  Id.; see also The Sports Auth., 89 F.3d 
at 964 (Plaintiff’s evidence of “misdirected phone calls” and evidence that 
customers believed there was “a connection between the restaurants and the 
stores” was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact). Provide also argues that 
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“such a small number of anecdotes is insufficient evidence of actual confusion 
when weighed against EA’s substantial market success.”  [Def.’s Mem. at 27, 
citing Alzheimer's Found. of Am., Inc. v. Alzheimer's Disease & Related Disorders 
Ass'n, Inc., No. 10 CIV. 3314 RWS, 2015 WL 4033019, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015) 
(“[A] small handful of anecdotes. . . is insufficient to establish the presence of 
actual confusion, particularly when weighed against the nearly $100 million in 
successful donations that [Plaintiff] receives annually.”)]. 
 The Court agrees that the seven incidents of misdirected consumer calls 
and inquiries seem de minimis in comparison with the volume of business 
transacted by both EA and Provide.  The jury may appropriately consider the 
number of instances of confusion identified by EA in determining the weight of 
EA’s evidence as to actual confusion.  At this stage, EA’s evidence is sufficient to 
create a material issue of fact as to the extent of actual confusion as to the 
origination and sponsorship of Provide's products caused by Provide’s use of the 
mark.  The Court does not consider this factor to weigh appreciably in favor of 
EA.    
 
5. ‘Bridging the Gap’ 
As the two parties operate in the same market and directly compete, there 
is no gap to bridge, and therefore this factor weighs firmly in favor of EA.  See 
Connecticut Community Bank, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 418 (“[T]he two banks are 
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already in direct competition . . . there is no gap to bridge, and this factor weighs 
in favor of [plaintiff].”). 
 
6. The Defendant’s Lack of Good Faith 
In assessing good faith, courts look to “whether the defendant adopted its 
mark with the intention of capitalizing on plaintiff's reputation and goodwill and 
any confusion between his and the senior user's product.”  The Sports Auth., 89 
F.3d at 964 (citations omitted).   
Several facts lead the Court to conclude that a reasonable juror could find 
that Provide has acted in bad faith in the instant case.  First, as discussed above, 
the word “edible” is an unnecessary descriptor of the word “fruit” and the word 
“arrangements” is hardly the most precise descriptor of boxes in which Provide 
has “deliberately placed” chocolate-dipped strawberries.  To once more state the 
obvious, every marketed product is arranged to look appealing or to avoid 
damage in transit or both.  A consumer would not expect a box of hand-dipped 
strawberries in which the strawberries were haphazardly dumped into a box and 
partially melted into a mess of coated fruit.  Such pragmatic ‘arrangements’ are 
not descriptive of the product but merely standard packaging.  From these two 
facts alone a reasonable jury could infer intent to exploit the goodwill created by 
EA’s existing mark.  Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 
1127, 1134 (2d Cir. 1982) (evidence of bad faith in deliberate use of wording 
similar to a protected mark where the chosen wording does not appropriately 
23 
 
describe the product at issue).  Second, EA’s evidence that Provide may have 
hired third party web advertisers to generate web traffic from “typosquatting” 
domains based on the EA mark to Provide’s own websites may provide a 
reasonable trier of fact with further indicia of bad faith on the part of Provide.  
Third, a reasonable juror can infer that the keyword bidding, typosquatting 
redirection of traffic, and advertisements based on the EA mark may have all 
been components of a deliberate marketing campaign on Provide’s part to 
generate “impressions” and “conversions” from consumers searching for EA 
products based on the EA mark.  This factor weighs in favor of EA.  
 
7. Product Quality 
Provide argues that the products offered for sale by the two parties are of 
similar quality.  EA argues that its products are of higher quality because, with 
respect the parties’ “dipped” or fruit products, Provide sells fruit dipped in 
“imitation chocolate,” while EA uses “real chocolate.”  [Pl.’s Mem. at 32].  This 
difference in quality, if true, raises sufficient evidence to at least create a material 
issue of fact as to differences in product quality.  However, this factor does not 
weigh appreciably in EA's favor.  
 
8. Consumer Sophistication 
The seventh Polaroid factor requires a court to analyze the sophistication 
of the consumers purchasing the competing products.  Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495 
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(2d Cir. 1961).  Highly sophisticated consumers are less likely to be confused.  
Plus Prods. v. Plus Disc. Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1007 (2d Cir. 1983). 
Provide argues, without citation to facts in the record, that “both EA’s and 
Provide’s consumers are individuals seeking to purchase high-quality gifts for 
special occasions.”  [Def.’s Mem. at 31].  Provide also argues that there is “no 
evidence in the record to suggest that the parties’ consumers are not sufficiently 
sophisticated.”  [Id.]  
EA has pointed to evidence that “the parties’ respective coated fruit goods 
are food items that generally are sold for between $20 and $40.”  [Pl.’s Mem. at 
24; Dkt. 119, Ex. 2].  Where the products at issue are “relatively inexpensive 
items,” a trier of fact “may be justified in concluding that the parties' customers 
are not likely to be sophisticated purchasers as to the goods in question.”  The 
Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 965; Lever Bros. Co. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251, 
259 (2d Cir.1982).  
A reasonable juror could conclude that a buyer of an “arranged” fruit gift 
package is no more sophisticated than a buyer of flowers, greeting cards or 
chocolates.  See, e.g., Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 219 
(2d Cir. 2003) (New York consumers of specialty pastas deemed unsophisticated 
because the pastas were inexpensive and sold in grocery stores, despite 
arguments that New Yorkers were “savvy and knowledgeable about restaurants 
and food.”).  While Second Circuit case law has associated the purchase of low-
cost goods in a supermarket environment with low customer sophistication, 
"price alone is not determinative of the care a consumer will take in making 
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purchases, and our touchstone remains the general impression that is left with 
the ordinary consumer.” The Sports Auth., supra at 965.   
Edible Arrangements and Provide's products are not expensive luxury 
products, but they are also not every day consumables one purchases in a 
supermarket.  They are moderately priced gift items which would be purchased 
with some, but not a great deal of scrutiny.  The marketplace in which the 
products are sold also weighs against sophistication.  Internet purchasing is both 
fast-paced and rapidly evolving.  Increasingly, purchases are often made 
impulsively on small screen cellular telephones or even using cell phone 
applications.  Given the relatively low price of the items and the evolving online 
marketplace, the court finds that this factor weighs in favor of EA. 
 
9. Overall Assessment 
The Court has found that five of the seven Polaroid factors weigh in favor 
of EA and that EA has at least raised a material issue of fact as to the remaining 
two.  In particular, the strength of EA’s mark, the similarity of the competing 
marks, the similarity of the competing products and the defendant’s bad faith 
each strongly suggest a likelihood of confusion from Provide’s use of its mark.  
Provide’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to EA’s trademark infringement 
claims (Counts I, II, IV and V) is therefore DENIED.   
 
ii. Keyword Purchases Under the Lanham Act 
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Provide next argues that its bidding on the phrase “edible arrangments” as 
a “non-consumer-facing keyword” for its search engine advertisements does not 
create a likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act.  The Second Circuit has 
held that keyword bidding may constitute a “use in commerce” which would be 
“subject to the same analysis under Lanham Act as any other allegation of 
infringement.”  Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2nd Cir. 2009).   
Provide nonetheless argues that “no one court in the entire country has ever held 
a defendant liable for trademark infringement by finding a likelihood of confusion 
based solely on the defendant’s keyword bidding.”  [Def.’s Mem. at 31].  Provide’s 
argument, however, misses the point – the conduct at issue is not a defendant’s 
keyword bidding, considered in a vacuum, but rather the effect of the keyword 
bidding in conjunction with the defendant’s advertisement.   
In Rescuecom, the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of a 
complaint against Google’s sale of a plaintiff’s mark in its AdWords program.  562 
F.3d at 130.  The court held that the sale of the mark as a keyword could 
constitute a “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act and also could create a 
likelihood of confusion if searchers were “misleadingly directed to the ads and 
websites of its competitors in a manner which leads them to believe mistakenly 
that these ads or websites are sponsored by, or affiliated with the plaintiff.”  Id.  
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he potential infringement in this 
context arises from the risk that while using [Plaintiff’s] mark to search for 
information about [Plaintiff’s] product, a consumer might be confused by a 
results page that shows a competitor's advertisement on the same screen, when 
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that advertisement does not clearly identify the source or its product.  Network 
Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 
2011).  Thus, the crux of the issue is whether a defendant’s keyword purchases, 
combined with the look and placement of that defendant’s advertisement, create 
a search results page which misleads, confuses or misdirects a consumer 
searching for a trademarked brand to the website of a competitor in a manner in 
which the source of the products offered for sale by the competitor is unclear.4 
The Second Circuit, however, has not adopted an explicit test for 
determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists from a defendant’s purchase 
of a trademark as a keyword term.  Both parties urge application of the Polaroid 
factors and note that at least two courts in this circuit have examined instances in 
which a competitor uses a trademark to purchase keywords by looking to the 
same seven Polaroid factors.  See Alzheimer's Foundation, 2015 WL 4033019 at 
*8; CJ Products LLC v. Snuggly Plushez LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 127, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011).  Several of the Polaroid factors, however, are not particularly helpful in this 
context, and the court in the Alzheimer’s case primarily considered the actual 
confusion factor.  With regard to actual confusion, the Alzheimer’s court looked 
                                                            
4 In Rescuecom, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiff had a plausible claim under the 
Lanham Act against the search provider (as opposed to the advertiser) in part because the 
plaintiff alleged that “the advertiser's link appears in a horizontal band at the top of the list of 
search results in a manner which makes it appear to be the most relevant search result and 
not an advertisement.”  562 F.3d at 130‐131.  Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that Google 
failed to “adequately identify the sponsored link as an advertisement, rather than a relevant 
search result.”  Id.  Thus a likelihood of confusion may have been created because a consumer 
searching for results by using the plaintiff’s mark would have been misled into believing that 
the defendant’s website was “most relevant” to the plaintiff’s mark and therefore that the 
defendant’s website was affiliated with the plaintiff.  Id.   
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to the doctrine of “initial interest confusion,” in which “a likelihood of confusion 
can arise when ‘a consumer who searches for the plaintiff's website with the aid 
of a search engine is directed instead to the defendant's site because of a 
similarity in the parties' website address.”  2015 WL 4033019, at *7 (quoting CJ 
Products, 809 F.Supp.2d at 160).  The Alzheimer’s court also considered the 
similarity of the marks factor by looking to the similarity of the URLs and the text 
in the links of the two competitors on the search results page.  Id., see also CJ 
Products, 809 F.Supp.2d at 160 (examining the similarity of the marks in the 
AdWords context and considering “the degree of similarity between [p]laintiff[s]’ 
service mark and the . . . advertisements appearing on the search-results page”).   
However, the Alzheimer’s court also noted that “[c]ompanies can and do 
regularly purchase other companies’ marks as search keywords and use those 
companies’ trademarks in the text of their search advertising in order to draw a 
contrast with the searched-for product and offer their own as an alternative.”  
2015 WL 4033019, at *6.  As an example, the Alzheimers court noted that “a 
Yahoo! search for the term “Honda Civic” brings up ads linking to websites from 
Hyundai, Volkswagen, and Toyota, comparing the Civic to their cars and 
suggesting that the consumer purchase an Elantra, Jetta, or Corolla instead.”  Id.  
The court held that those ads did not implicate the Lanham Act “because they 
draw a clear distinction between the products and do not imply the trademark 
holder's sponsorship or approval.”  Id.   
Thus, prior courts have been primarily concerned with keyword bidding in 
conjunction with advertising that creates a search results page that is misleading 
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to the consumer.  In considering the question of whether such conduct violates 
the Lanham Act, several Polaroid factors can be helpful when viewed from the 
perspective of a user of the internet search engine at issue (the “user”), in 
particular: (i) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark as a unique search term related 
to a distinct line of products, and (ii) the similarity of the marks and whether the 
defendant’s mark draws a clear distinction as a competing brand.  One additional 
factor described by the Ninth Circuit in Network Automation can also be helpful: 
(iii) what the consumer saw on the screen and reasonably believed, given the 
context.  638 F.3d at 1150.   
 With regard to the strength of the mark, the court considers whether a user 
entering EA’s mark as a search term “is more likely to be looking for a particular 
product” rather than a category of products, and therefore “could be more 
susceptible to confusion when sponsored links appear that advertise a similar 
product from a different source.”  Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149.  The 
Court earlier found that there was evidence that EA’s mark had acquired 
secondary distinctiveness in the marketplace.  Similarly, the Court here finds that 
a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that a consumer searching for “edible 
arrangements” is looking for a distinct product line of aesthetically shaped fruit 
and not merely for any and all gifts containing boxes of edible fruits and berries.  
And with regard to the similarity of the marks, the Court finds that the Provide 
advertisements it has examined make a very poor effort to differentiate either a 
competing product or seller.  
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The Ninth Circuit also looked to “what the consumer saw on the screen and 
reasonably believed, given the context.”  Id. at 1150, quoting Hearts on Fire Co. v. 
Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F.Supp.2d 274, 289 (D. Mass. 2009).  As to this factor, one 
district court in the District of Massachusetts considered possible “downstream” 
confusion, and whether the user would be unknowingly misdirected to the 
website of a competitor.  See Hearts on Fire Co., 603 F.Supp.2d at 289 (noting the 
importance of whether “the consumer clicked on the sponsored link thinking that 
he would find products” affiliated with the mark, but upon landing at the 
competitor’s website “nothing there would immediately alert him to his mistake”).  
Here, Provide’s choice not to identify Pro Flowers or Sherri’s Berries as the 
advertiser in the text of the advertisement or the link, and only in the small print 
of the URL, contributes to a misleading environment for the consumer.  In 
particular, a user searching for EA’s products might not even know that they had 
clicked on a link for a competitor’s product until they actually landed on the 
webpage of one of Provide’s sellers, or even after that point  
A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Provide’s purchase of “edible 
arrangements” as a non-consumer facing keyword could result in a likelihood of 
confusion by directing consumers to a search results page in which it advertised 
“edible fruit arrangements” in an text advertisement in which the seller is only 
identified in the small print of the URL.  See Figure II.  A jury could find that the 
purpose and effect of Provide’s keyword bidding – in conjunction with its use of 
EA’s mark in its advertisement on the search results page – was to mislead 
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consumers as to sponsorship or affiliation with EA and to misdirect the web 
traffic of users searching for EA’s mark. 
 
iii. Provide’s Defense of Fair Use 
A company’s use of such descriptive words and phrases to describe that 
company’s products may constitute “descriptive fair use” and be permissible 
even where a plaintiff owns a federal registration for a trademark that is similar to 
the phrase that the defendant uses to describe its goods.  15 U.S.C.A. § 
1115(b)(4).  Courts use a three-part test to determine whether use of a mark is a 
descriptive fair use, namely, if the use was made: (1) other than as a mark, (2) in a 
descriptive sense, and (3) in good faith.  Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F. 3d 295, 
308 (2nd Cir. 2013).  Provide argues that it did not use the phrase “edible fruit 
arrangements” as a trademark, and EA did not contest this.5  Rather, the parties 
dispute whether Provide’s use of the phrase was descriptive and in good faith.   
Provide argues that its use of “edible fruit arrangements” was descriptive 
because the phrase describes the composition of several of its products, which 
“are fruit products (“fruit”)” that “are organized in a certain manner (“arranged”)” 
and are “intended for consumption (“edible”).”  [Def.’s Mem. at 18].  Provide has 
                                                            
5 “A trademark use occurs when a mark indicates the source or origin of 
consumer products.”  Dessert Beauty, Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 424 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) aff'd, 329 F. App’x 333 (2d Cir. 2009).  The Second Circuit has 
equated “use as a mark with the use of a term as a symbol to attract public 
attention.”  JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.3d 390, 400 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotations omitted).  
32 
 
not identified which of its products, specifically, qualify in its view as edible 
arrangements of fruit.  EA argues that Provide does not sell “arrangements” at all 
and submitted as an exhibit in opposition to Provide’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment a photograph of one of Provide’s fruit products in which chocolate-
dipped berries were, in Provide’s own words, “organized so that the berries are 
evenly spaced and angled toward a particular corner of the box.”  [Def.’s Rep. 
Mem. at 3; Dkt. 136, Ex. TT].  Provide describes this as an “arrangement.”  [Id.]. 
Miriam Webster defines an “arrangement” as “the way that things or 
people are organized for a particular purpose or activity.”6  The dictionary 
definition of the word does not include any component requiring artistic 
placement or organization.  Thus, Provide is correct that for its products to 
constitute an “arrangement,” the definition of the word requires only a purposeful 
or intentional presentation, which would seemingly include a box of strawberries 
that are evenly spaced and facing the same direction. 
A consumer and a reasonable juror, however, may understand the word 
“arrangement” to connote both purposefulness as well as something more, such 
as a collection of items that is organized in an artistic or creative manner – 
presented so as to enhance aesthetic value through color, shape or format.  
Thus, Provide’s use of the word “arrangement” may be literally accurate but 
descriptively misleading.  Similarly, while the word “edible” is an accurate 
description of the fruit Provide sells, a reasonable juror may find that the word is, 
                                                            
6  http://www.merriam‐webster.com/dictionary/arrangement 
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as the Court discussed above, largely redundant of the word “fruit,” given that 
few consumers are likely searching for “inedible fruit.”  See EMI Catalogue P'ship 
v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(material issue of fact as to descriptive use where the alliterative phrase “Swing 
Swing Swing” was unnecessary to describe the actions of three actors hitting 
golf shots when the single word “swing” would have sufficed).  The defense of 
fair use is designed to protect “the public's right to use descriptive words or 
images in good faith in their ordinary descriptive sense.”  Car-Freshner Corp. v. 
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995).  EA has raised a material 
issue of fact as to whether Provide’s use of the phrase “edible fruit 
arrangements” relies upon the ordinary meanings of those words to describe a 
product containing a box of “deliberately placed” strawberries.   
But even if Provide’s use of the phrase was appropriately descriptive, a 
reasonable juror could find that Provide chose to use the words “edible” and 
“arrangements” in bad faith in order to maximize consumer confusion and 
generate sales from misdirected web traffic, when other terms not involving EA’s 
mark could have better described Provide’s products (such as, e.g., “chocolate-
dipped berries” instead of “edible fruit” and “gift boxes” instead of 
“arrangements”).  In addition, for the reasons discussed above in examining the 
Polaroid factors, a reasonable juror could certainly find that in the instant case 
Provide deliberately chose the phrase “edible fruit arrangements” as part of a 
marketing campaign designed to capitalize on the popularity of EA's products by 
misdirecting consumer traffic to Provide’s websites through the use of EA’s mark 
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in advertising, keyword bidding and typosquatting.  EA has therefore raised a 
material issue of fact as to whether Provide’s use of the phrase “edible fruit 
arrangements” was truly descriptive and in good faith. 
 
b. EA’s Claim for Trademark Dilution 
The Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”) “allows the owner of a 
‘famous mark’ to enjoin a person from using ‘a mark or trade name in commerce 
that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous 
mark.’”  Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc ., 600 F.3d 93, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)).  Dilution is defined as “the lessening of the capacity of a 
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125.  To 
plead dilution under the TDRA, a trademark owner must allege four elements: (i) 
that the mark is famous; (ii) that the defendant is making use of the mark in 
commerce; (iii) that such use began after the mark became famous; and (iv) that 
there is a likelihood of dilution as a result of the defendant’s use.  Id.; Tiffany (NJ) 
Inc., 600 F.3d at 111.  The parties in the instant matter contest the extent to which 
EA’s mark is famous and would be diluted as a result of Provide’s use.  
i. The Fame of EA’s Mark 
“[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming 
public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of 
the mark’s owner.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).  Courts may consider the following 
factors: (i) the extent and geographic reach of the advertising and publicity of the 
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mark, (ii) the volume and geographic extent of the sales of goods offered under 
the mark, (iii) the extent of actual consumer recognition of the mark, and (iv) 
whether the mark was registered on the principal register.  Id.  On summary 
judgment, whether a mark has attained the requisite level of fame is a question of 
fact that must be left to the trier of fact if the plaintiff shows “more than a mere 
scintilla of evidence” of fame.  See Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 450. 
EA notes that it generated nearly a billion dollars in sales between 2001 
and 2009.  [Dkt. 136, Ex. C at 4]. In the years 2008 and 2009, EA spent $28 million 
in advertising.  [Id.].  EA’s mark is registered on the principal register.  And, as 
noted earlier, Provide’s own consumer survey found that EA had 77% brand 
awareness among consumers nationally.  [Dkt. 134, Ex. M. at PC 000967].  At this 
stage, EA has pointed to sufficient evidence suggesting that its mark is famous 
as to raise a material issue of fact.  See, e.g., Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 450 
(Plaintiff’s $20 million advertising spend, $675 million in revenues, and extensive 
advertising in mainstream and industry media were “sufficient indicators of fame 
to withstand a summary judgment challenge.”).   
ii. Dilution by Blurring 
Dilution by blurring is “association arising from the similarity between a 
mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the 
famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(2)(B). “Dilution by blurring refers . . . to ‘the 
whittling away of [the] established trademark’s selling power and value through 
its unauthorized use by others.’”  Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 111.  There are six 
non-exhaustive factors which courts consider in determining whether there has 
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been dilution by blurring, including: (i) the degree of similarity between the 
marks, (ii) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark, 
(iii) whether use of the famous mark is exclusive, (iv) the degree of recognition of 
the famous mark, (v) whether the user of the mark intended to create an 
association with the famous mark, and (vi) any actual association between the 
mark and the famous mark.  15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(2)(B)(-vi).   
The first two factors – similarity and distinctiveness – overlap with the first 
two Polaroid factors examined above, and, for the reasons stated above, the 
court finds that these facts weigh in favor of EA at this stage.  The fourth factor – 
degree of recognition – also weighs in EA’s favor for the same reasons discussed 
above in the Court’s determination that EA has pointed to sufficient evidence of 
fame in the form of wide public recognition of EA’s mark.  With regard to the fifth 
factor, EA has also pointed to evidence that Provide intended to create an 
association with EA’s mark by engaging in a deliberate marketing strategy to 
misdirect consumers from EA’s website through the use of EA’s mark in 
advertising, keyword bidding and typosquatting.  EA has raised a material issue 
of fact with regard to whether Provide’s conduct constituted dilution by blurring.  
 
iii. Dilution by Tarnishment 
Dilution by tarnishment is an “association arising from the similarity 
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of 
the famous mark.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C).  “A trademark may be tarnished 
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when it is linked to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an 
unwholesome or unsavory context, with the result that the public will associate 
the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant’s goods with the plaintiff’s 
unrelated goods.”  Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994). 
EA’s sole evidence in support of its dilution by tarnishment claim is the 
fact that Provide coats its “dipped fruit” products in “imitation chocolate,” 
instead of “real chocolate.”  [Pl.’s Mem. at 32].  In this regard, EA has identified a 
difference in quality between the two competing products.  However, the statute 
prohibits dilution resulting in “reputational harm” and “[t]he sina qua non of 
tarnishment is a finding that plaintiff's mark will suffer negative associations 
through defendant's use.”  Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 
F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996).  The critical missing link in EA’s dilution by 
tarnishment claim is that the imitation chocolate used in Provide’s products will 
taste, look or smell poorly to the consumer, resulting in a negative association 
with EA’s mark.  EA assumes this fact to be true, and its claim would require a 
trier of fact to assume the truth that fact as well.  At this stage, however, EA’s 
“mere scintilla” of evidence of dilution by tarnishment is sufficient to create a 
material issue of fact.   
 
c. EA’s Claim for Cybersquatting 
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) was passed in 
part to prohibit “the bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as 
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Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with 
such marks—a practice commonly referred to as ‘cybersquatting’.”  Sporty's 
Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000).  
‘Typosquatting’ – in which the defendant registers intentional misspellings of a 
distinctive marks – has been found to be an actionable form of cybersquatting. 
See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 2001); Gioconda Law Grp. 
PLLC v. Kenzie, 941 F. Supp. 2d 424, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“courts have expressly 
held that the ACPA covers typosquatting”). 
To prevail on its ACPA claim, EA must show that Provide: (1) had a bad 
faith intent to profit; and (2) registers, traffics in or uses a domain name that is 
identical or confusingly similar to EA’s famous and/or distinctive mark.  See 
Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 496-498; 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(A). 
Provide argues that EA has failed to identify any evidence that it registered, 
trafficked in or used the domain names at issue.  EA admits that “the true 
registrant of the Typosquatting Domains has not been conclusively determined,” 
but nonetheless argues that Provide “and/or its agents trafficked in and/or used” 
the domains to divert EA’s customers.  [Pl.’s Mem. at 35].  In a prior ruling 
denying Provide’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, this Court held that “if 
through discovery it becomes apparent that the true owner of the typosquatting 
domains registered the domain names on behalf of Provide Commerce, this 
domain name registrant would be considered an agent” of the defendant and 
would not have been a necessary party to the action in order to afford complete 
relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a).  Edible Arrangements, LLC v. Provide 
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Commerce, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-00250 VLB, 2015 WL 1321441, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 
24, 2015).  Having conducted discovery into the matter, EA’s sole evidence in 
support of its allegation that Provide’s agents trafficked and/or used the domains 
at issue consists of the following facts: 
1. Provide hired two digital marketing companies in late 2013 to increase 
its web traffic – adMarketplace, Inc. and 7Search, Inc. [Dkt. 136, Ex.’s 
DD, KK]. 
2. Shortly thereafter in January 2014, adMarketplace and 7Search records 
show that redirects from the typosquatting domains to Provide’s 
websites began and continued until June 2014. [Dkt. 136, Ex.’s EE, II, 
NN]. 
3. Consumers attempting to reach ediblearrangements.com were 
redirected to Provide’s competing website thousands of times.  [Dkt. 
136, Ex.’s EE, II, NN]. 
4. Provide admits that both adMarketplace and 7Search were somehow 
involved in the redirects because both companies’ names appeared in 
the URL reference code of the redirects.  [Dkt. 136, Ex DD Twu Dep. at 
207:4-14]. 
5. The redirects stopped after EA filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction and Provide sent a letter instructing adMarketplace to “[s]top 
sending [Provide] traffic from these domains.”  [Def.’s Mem. at 13]. 
 
It is clear from the facts above that Provide benefited from the 
Typosquatting Domains in the form of additional web traffic and that Provide’s 
web marketing agents played a role in redirecting web traffic from the 
Typosquatting Domains to Provide’s own website.  However, the precise role that 
Provide’s marketing agents played in the process of registering the domains at 
issue is still unclear.  EA failed to offer evidence indicating that the redirection of 
web traffic from theTtyposquatting Domains could not have occurred unless 
adMarketplace and 7search were the “users” of those websites within the 
meaning of the ACPA, through, for example, hosting or maintaining the 
typosquatting domains or implementing the coding which resulted in the traffic 
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redirection.  EA had the opportunity to collect records from both adMarketplace 
and 7search, to discover Provide’s contracts and communications with both 
companies, to depose Provide’s web marketing team and the opportunity to 
develop expert testimony on the issue to assist a trier of fact in drawing further 
inferences from the evidence described above.  EA failed to do so. 
Moreover, even if there was clear evidence linking adMarketplace and 
7search with the “use” of the domain names within the meaning of ACPA, the 
statute makes clear that a defendant can only be liable for “use” of a 
cybersquatting domain “if that person is the domain name registrant or that 
registrant's authorized licensee.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(E).  Thus, even if EA’s 
evidence were sufficient to raise a material issue of fact with respect to whether 
an agent of Provide “used” the Typosquatting Domains to redirect web traffic to 
Provide, EA failed to offer evidencethat either Provide or its agent(s) are the 
actual registrants of the domains or licensees of the actual registrants.  Under the 
plain language of the statute, EA has therefore raised insufficient evidence to 
sustain an ACPA claim.  Count VI of the Complaint is DISMISSED. 
 
V. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, the defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment [Dkt. 116] is GRANTED IN PART with respect to EA’s ACPA claim 
(Count VI) AND DENIED IN PART with respect to all other claims.  Count VI is 
DISMISSED.  This case will proceed to trial with respect to all other claims. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 
 
       ________/s/______________ 
       Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant 
       United States District Judge 
      
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: July 29, 2016 
 
